STRONG v. RAILWAY CO.

with Spain." .Yet these were doubtless honest, but were regarded
by the impeaching power as mistaken and pernicious opinions.
Even Judge Humphreys, who was impeached before the Senate
of the United States for maiking a secession speech, may have
honestly believed what he said, and might have. supposed hi'
motives good; but this consideration was so unimportant that it
was never once mentioned on the trial.
The result -is, that an impeachable high crime or misdemeanor
is one in its nature or consequences subversive of some fundamental or essentialprinciple of government or highly prejudicial
to the public interest, and this may consist.of a violation of the
Constitution, of law, of. an official oath, or of duty, by an act
committed or omitted, or, without violating a.positive law, by the
abuse of discretionary powers from improper motives or for an
improperpurpose.
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IL NORTON STRONG v. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY COMPANY.
A bill of lading, so far as it is a receipt, is oben to explanation, and the carrier may show that the amount which actually came Into his hands is different
from that stated in the bill.
This rule is subject to qualification where third persons have acquired rights
by purchase, or advance of money based upon statements coained in the bill.
An intermediate consignee, by whom property is received subject to back
charges, is liable to an action therefor in case of neglect or refusal to make payment.
Neither the intermediate nor the final consignee can deduct from the freight
earned by the prior carrier the value of any difference between the amount delivered
to him and that receipted for in the bill of lading, where the carrier can show an
error in the bill, and that he actually delivered all that he received.
A custom for intermediate consignees to make such deductions is uncertain, unreasonable, and void.
Even if such custom was valid, an action would lie against the intermediate consignee to recover the amount of such deduction, unless he had paid over the money,
or in some manner changed his legal position relative to the owner with respect
to the money after maling the deduction.

THIS was an action of assumpsit, brought to test the right of
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an intermediate consignee to deduct the value of shortage in the
cargo, when such shortage does not arise from the fault of the
prior carrier-in other words, to determine whether a railway,
receiving from a vessel a cargo of grain, is authorized by a custom, prevailing generally at the lake ports, to deduct from the
freight earned the value of a deficiency in the cargo, as shown by
a comparison of the amount stated in the bill of lading, and that
exhibited by the railway's own measurement, when it is affirmatively proved that the vessel has delivered all she received. The
facts of the case are stated in the opinion.
ff. B. Brown, for plaintiffs.
Maynard, .Xeddaugh & Swift, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY, J.-This case presents questions regarding the proof
and validity of a, mercantile custom, by which an intermediate
consignee is authorized to deduct from the back freight earned
any deficiency in the cargo, as shown by a. comparison of the
bill of lading with the measurement of the carrier receiving it.
It appears that the plaintiff's vessel, the schooner Swallow,
took on board a quantity of corn at Chicago, consigned to the
Bank of Montreal, Coburg, and stated in the bill of ladingto be
20,0346 bushels. This was the measurement of the elevator at
Chicago, and was supposed 'at the time to be correct. On the
delivery of the cargo to the defendants as intermediate consignees,
at Sarnia, a deficiency of 20548 bushels was discovered, and the
defendants therefore refused to pay- the freight upon the amount.
actually delivered except subject to a deduction of the value of
this deficiency, justifying their refusal upon the custom mentioned.
The evidence of the master of the vessel, if trustworthy, would
show very clearly that the apparent deficiency was in consequence
of erroneous measurement at Chicago; and as the supposed custom makes no exception of the case, where the master, is not in
fault, we must consider its validity on the assumption that the
facts are as claimed by the plaintiff.
It may be well to see at the outset what the rights of the parties
would be in the absence of any such custom, and what the changes
are which it proposes to make in the law.
There can be no doubt that, although the bill of lading specifies
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the amount received, it is notwithstanding like other receipts open'
to explanation, and the carrier is at liberty to show that the'
actual amount which came to his hands is different from that
stated: Tfolfe v. Myers, 3 Sanf. S. C. 7 ; .Teed v. Whiting, Id.
399 ; Dickerson v. Seelye, 12 Barb. 99 ; Backus v. Sch. Merengo,
6 McLean 487; Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray 287. And see
YEllis v. Willard, 9 ,N. Y. 529. The qualification of this rule is,
where third persons have acquired rights by purchase, or advance
of money based upon the statement contained in the bill of lading,
and relying upon its accuracy, the extent of which qualification,
and when and against whoms applicable, it does not become important to discuss here, inasmuch as it is not claimed' that any
such rights have intervened.
Although the consignee of property is authorized to recoup
from tLe freight earned any losses properly chargeable to the carrier, it is well settled, and indeed follows logically from the rule
before stated, that he is not entitled to deduct as deficiencies any
difference between the amount delivered to him, and that receipted
by the bill of lading where the carrier can show an error in the bill,
and ,hat he actually delivered all that. he received: .ossell v.
Price, 16 Ill. 408; Byder v. 1all, 7 Allen 456; Myer v. Peck,
83 Barb. S. C. 582; 28 N. Y. 590; Sears v. Wingate, 3 Allen
103. See, for the same principle, Bowman v. Hilton, 11 Ohio
803 ; Lee v. Salter, Lalor 163. That the carrier has a lien upon
the cargo for the freight earned is not disputed: 8 Kent 214;
Chitty on Carriers 220 ; Pars. Mere. L. 212. And an intermediate consignee, by whom the property is received subject to the
charges, is liable to an action therefor in case of neglect or refusal
to make payment: Abbott on Shipping 421; Canfieldv. Northern
Railroad Co., 18 Barb. 586.
The custom alleged, if valid, changes the settled law in several
important particulars. Firstly, it precludes the carrier, as between
himself md the intermediate consignee, from explaining the bill
of lading, and showing any error that may have 9ccurred in stating the quantity, and this without regard to the question of intervening eqn-i,.
Secondly. it gives to the intermediate consignee
the right nu,. mily to deduct the deficiencies chargeable to the
carrier, but also all such discrepancies between the bill of lading
and the actual amount delivered by the latter, as have resulted
from erroneous measure or count, and consequently are not defi-
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ciencies in any proper or legal sense, and could not in a suit
between the carrier and the ultimate consignee be recouped at all.
Thirdly, as to any amount thus deducted, and not properly chargeable to the carrier, he .is deprived of his lien upon the cargo, and
if he has any remedy for it he is obliged to resort to the personal
responsibility of the party liable to him, in lieu of the security
which he took into his own hands when the cargo was received.
Meantime the value of the supposed deficiency is paid over to the
ultimate consignee, who has no claim to it whatever, if in fact he
receives all that was consigned to him.
Before proceeding to discuss the custom upon principle, we
shall examine the cases cited upon the argument, and which are
supposed to have some bearing upon the question of its validity.
There are several cases where it has been held to be the duty of
an intermediate carrier to protect the interest of the consignee in
the property carried, and where certain powers for the adjustment
of damages actually sustained have been recognised as vested in

him. In Bissel v. Price, 16 Ill. 414, it is said that, "While the
warehouseman or carrier is authorized to advance for and on
account of the consignee previous charges upon the goods, be is
bound to act in good faith towards, and to carefully watch the
interest of the owner, whoever he may be. He is bound to do
this to the same extent that a prudent man would were he present
and acting for himself. He must see that the goods are in apparent good order, as described in the previous bill of lading, or,
if not, use reasonable exertions to ascertain how they became
damaged, and the party liable therefor. So also, to the same
extent, he must see that the previous charges are reasonable
before he is authorized to pay them." There is nothing in this
indicating that an intermediate carrier is or may be vested with
greater powers than those possessed by the owner himself; or that
the prior carrier, in dealing with him, can be subjected to
demands against which he would have a complete defence as
between himself and the ultimate consignee. On the contrary the
court hold the intermediate carrier to be vested, as respects the
property carried, only with certain powers of the owner, and
bound on his behalf to exercise them with diligence and good
faith.
The facts in the Fitc burg ' Worcester .ailroa'd Co. v. Hanna,
6 Gray 539, were that several carriers, whose operations consti-
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tuted one continuous line of transportation from Fitchburg to
Newv York, and who, by a mutual agreement, divided between
them, in certain specified proportions, the freight earned upon the
whole route, had carried property for the defendant, and, in a
suis brought by one of them to recover the charges, the defendant
sought to recoup damages to the property, occurring somewhere
on the route, but not shown to have occurred upon that portion
over which the operations of the plaintiff extended. The court
held the recoupment allowable, but at the same time said: "If
this service had been performed, and no special agreement had
teen made in relation to the terms upon which it should be done,
each of the several parties who contributed towards it would have
been entitled to a reasonable compensation, in proportion to the
service which they respectively rendered, and would have been
liable only for such failures and delinquencies as occurred on
their own portions of the line." L It is obvious that the facts as
stated have no analogy to those now before us, while the general
rule stated by the court, in the absence of any joint undertaking,
is the one which the defendants in this case seek to avoid by
proof of the custom.
The case of Davis v. rattison, 24 N. Y. 317, which was supposed on the argument to be most directly in point, does not seem
to us on careful examination to be even analogous. It appeafs
that one Davis received at Oswego 3700 bushels of wheat, to be
carried by canal, and delivered to the defendant as .ntermediate
consignee at Troy. He delivered all but fifty bushels, which he
either converted to his own use .or lost. The defendant offered to
pay the freight if Davis would deduct the value of this deficiency;
but he refused to do so, and action was brought to recover the
whole amount. The court held that the defendant had a right to
make the deduction. Now it is quite evident that that case differs
from the" present in all its legal bearings. It was not claimed
there that any custom had changed the law of carriers applicable
,to the case, but the defence was rested upon general principles.
It does not appear from the report that Davis disputed the deficiency being properly chargeable to him, and it was therefore
clearly a case where the deduction could have been made by way
of recoupment, had the action been brought against the owner
himself. And it was not held or intimated in that case that the
I See DarlingY. Boston and Worcester Railroad Co., 11 Allen.
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carrier was liable to have deduction made for deficiencies, for
which as carrier he was not insurer against, or that the intermediate carrier had greater privileges in respect to deductions
than were possessed by the owner. On the contrary, the whole
reasoning of the case shows that the court considered the intermediate consignee as standing in respect to the suit, in the place
of the owner, bound to protect his interest and entitled to all his
defences, but no more. In short this case decides that a carrier,
suing to recover freight, may collect the amount earned by him,
less any loss occurring to the property while in his hands, and
properly chargeable to him as carrier, and the question, whether
by custom he might be charged with other losses, or with supposed
deficiencies not existing in fact, was not before the court, and
there was no expression of opinion upon it.
The case of Canfield v. The North~ern Railroad Co., 18 Barb.
586, is more nearly like the present in its facts than any other
which has been reported, and it was there held that the intermediate carrier had no right to deduct from the freight earned the
amount of a discrepancy between the bill of lading and the
amount delivered to him, where it was shown that the discrepancy
occurred by mistake in stating the amount in the bill of lading.
But as the defence there was not rested on evidence of usage, the
case cannot be considered an authority on the point now involved,
and we have been unable to find any other that bears very
directly upon it. We must therefore consider the custom in question upon general principles, and see whether it is capable of being
sustained by them.
There are many customs which to a certain extent are conve-.
nient, but to which the law does not allow a compulsory force,
either because they have never been generally acquiesced in, or
because to give them general application would in some cases
violate fundamental principles and rights. The law-has established certain rules which are to test the legal validity of a custom,
and we shall now examine the one alleged in the light of the
standard thus afforded.
1. Before any custom can be admitted into the law, it must
appear that the usage has been general and uniform, and the custom peaceably acquiesced in, and not subject to contention and
dispute: Broom's Legal Maxims (5th Am. ed.), 828; see Oelrich
v. F ord, 23 How. 49. It is not very clear that the evidence in
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this case establishes any such custom. The testimony of witnest os shows that the question of shortage is frequently the subject of dispute. Captain Elsie says: "The custom is sometimes
acquiesced in by the captains.of vessels, and sometimes disputed.
is large, they
If ne shortage is small, they generally pay it; if it.
the owners."
settled
by
generally dispute it, and leave it to be
the
defendants,
agent
of
freight
Mr. Stephenson, the general
says: "I have known captains refuse to pay the shortage, but we
always have the freight in our own hands before we settle. We
invariably refuse to pay the captains until the two 'principals are
agreed." Captain Montgomery, after testifying that the custom
is'universal, says : "I have known the question of shortage disputed at least a hundred times." Several other witnesses give
evidence that the custom is general, but the impression which the
whole evidence leaves upon our minds is that the deduction of
shortage is submitted to when the carrier concedes that it is his
-fault, or when the amount is not beyond what is usual and incident to transportation; but it is disputed in other cases., A custom varying the -common law must be clearly proved. But we do
not find clear evidence in this case that shipowners concede their
liability to have deductions made from freight earned for the
value of property receipted for by mistake. That the railway
companies assert the right is fully shown; but it must be generally assented to as well as asserted .before the custom can be
established.
2. Another essential to a good custom is that it be certain.
The evidence of usage in this case does not inform us whether,
under it, the carrier is to have any remedy for the freight deducted, and, if he is, whether that remedy is left to common-law
rules, or is provided for by the custom itself. We will not assume
that the carrier is to be deprived of all remedy, for that would be
so manifestly unjust and unreasonable that it could not be seriously urged that the law should sanction it. And if he has any
remedy, it must be either, first, against the consignor; or, second,
against the intermediate consignee ; or, third, against the owner
or ultimate cbnsignee. And it may be well to examine the
grounds upon which either of the three may be held liable, as
well as the reasonableness of remitting the carrier to a remedy
against one rather than the others.
If the consignor was not himself the owner of the property,
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and had made no express contract with the carrier, either for the
payment of freight, or for the delivery of any specific quantity,
and that which was delivered was by the bill of lading deliverable
to the consignee on payment of charges, the consignor could not
be liable over to the carrier in a case like the present, except by
the application of some rule unknown to the common law: Pars.
Mere. L. 352, and note; Chitty on Carriers 208; Barber v.
Havens, 17 Johns. 234; Drew v. Bird, Mood. & M. 156. It
might perhaps be suggested that the consignor having undertaken
to ship a certain quantity to the consignee, any payment to the
latter for deficiencies may be recovered for as a payment made to
the use of the former; but any liability upon this theory must
fall to the ground, if in fact the consignor was under no contract
obligation to forward a specific quantity to the consignee, or, if
being under such obligation, he would still be in time under his
contract to forward the balance afterwards. And while the consignor is still entitled to fulfil his contract by delivery of the
grain instead of paying its value, we do not perceive how any
third party can be authorized in correcting an error in part performance to compel the consignee, who is entitled to grain, to
accept instead its price at a distant point. Such a case would
require ratification by both the consignor and the consignee
before the former could be made liable to the carrier, and, in
the absence of ratification, the latter must seek his remedy elsewhere.
That the cons gnee, or owner, would be liable, where the
amount deducted from the freight by the intermediate carrier
had been forwarded to and received by him, there can be no doubt..
If he receives all the property shipped to, him, a sum of money,
paid in addition, for a supposed deficiency not existing in fact, is
paid without any consideration, and he -can have no claim to
retain it. But if this alleged custom is legal and compulsory, and
the carrier is remitted to the owner of the property for his remedy,
we shall have here, perhaps, the first instance in the law where a
person is required by legal compulsion to make a payment, or submit to an exaction, and then empowered immediately to sue
and recover it back from the very person to whose use he has
passed it.
But while the owner would be liable in such a case, after the.
-money has been paid to him, it is equally clear that at the common
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law the intermediate consignee would also be liable, at least until
he :.ad paid over the money, or in some manner changed his legal
position relative to the owner with respect to the money, after
making the deduction. His position would be that of an agent to
whom money had been paid for a principal not entitled to it; and
that an action is maintainable against the agent under such circumstances is well settled: Barber v. Bristol and -Exeter Bailway, 7 E. L. & E. 528 ; Snowden v. Davis, 1 Taunt. 359 ; -Edwards v. ifodding, 5 Id. 815; Hearsey v. Pruyn,7 Johns. 179;
La Farge v. Kneeland, 7 Cow. 456; 1 Pars. on Cont. 79;
Smith's Mere. L. Book 1, chap. 5-7. And treating this custom
as perfectly valid, we do not see why this action is not properly
brgught against these defendants, if the deduction was made under
protest, and they had not accounted with the owner of the corn
when suit was commenced. Customs of this description are to be
strictly construed, and we are not to assume that they changed
the common law beyond what expressly appears: Broom's Legal
Maxims (5th Am. ed.) 829. Assuming that defendants had the
right to make the deduction at the outset, but that this dods not
deprive the plaintiff of all remedy, we have only to see against
whom the common law would give that remedy, and we cannot
doubt that these defendants would be liable either as consignees,
who had received property subject to charges, or as agents, who
had exacted money for.a principal who .has no right to retain it.
The anomaly of allowing them to make the deduction,'and then
have it recovered bai.k from them, is no greater than to allow a
similar recovery from the ultimate consignee, on whose behalf the
deduction is made. But we do not propose to place our judgment
upon this ground exclusively, as we are clearly satisfied the custom itself cannot be enforced in the law.
3. All customs must be reasonable. If the one in question
were confined to vesting in the intermediate consignee the same
power to refuse to pay freight, in cases in which the owner would
be justified in doing so, it would not exceed the reasonable province of a mercantile usage. But it goes very much further when
it makes the bill of lading conclusive in favor of the intermediate
carrier, and allows him to make deductions for supposed deficiencies not in fact existing, which the owner himself would not
be permitted to make, and is specially unreasonable if it deprives
the carrier of his lien, and remits him to a personal responsibility
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which he never relied upon, whether he is given a remedy in all
cases against the consignor, or required to follow the money to
the -hands of the owner, who will usually reside at a point distant
from the place where the exaction was made, and frequently in a
foreign country. That such a custom may be convenient, and
operate justly in most cases, is very true; but it can only rest
for its observance on the consent of the parties.
The courts are frequently required to hold a custom unreasonable and void, notwithstanding strong reasons urged in favor of
it as a rule of convenience, by the class by whom it has been
adopted, and where the hardships in any case would not be greater
than in this. The case of Leuckhart v. Cooper, 3 Bing. N. 0.
99, is an illustration of such cases. The usage given in evidence
there was for public warehousemen in London, to have a general
lien on all goods from time to time housed wiih them for and
in the name of the merchants, or other persons by whom they
were employed, for all moneys or balances due from such merchants or persons, for expenses incurred about goods consigned
from abroad, and irrespective of the ownership of the goods upon
which the lien was claimed. In Bryant v. Commonwealth Ins.
Co., 6 Pick. 131, a custom for the master of a vessel stranded, to,
sell the cargo without necessity, was held void. In Bowen v.
Stoddard, 10 Met. 380, a custom among the merchants of New
Bedford and Fair Haven, engaged in the whaling trade, to accept.
the bills of their masters, drawn for supplies furnished abroad,.
failed to receive the sanction of the court on the ground that a.
usage could not be reasonable which put at hazard the propertyof the owner at the pleasure of the master. And'see 7ordan v...
Meredith, 3 Yeates 318, and Spear v. Newell, referred to in 23
Vt. 159. Some of the cases cited are more liable to work injus-tice generally than the present ; but as a custom, if good at all,
is compulsory in all cases falling within it (1 Bl. Com. 78), we
are not at liberty to regad it exclusively in the light of its effects
in the majority of cases. Special customs are so liable to create
confusion of legal rules, in directions not contemplated in their
adoption, that they are admitted into the law with great reluctance ; and it is not often a hardship to parties to reject a custom,
so long as they are left free to make their own bargains, and to,
incorporate it in their contract, if they see fit to do so.
We have not deemed it necessary to consider how far, if the.
VOL. X.-44
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custom were certain and valid, an adjustment between the two
carriers for an actual loss or conversion, could be binding on the
owner in the absence of ratification by him; or how far a similar
adjustment for a supposed deficiency, which &id not exist at all,
couti bind either the consign6r or consignee. It is sufficient that
there are in the usage elements which prevent its being accepted
in the law as a compulsory custom. We think the circuit judge
erred in holding it valid, and the judgment must be reversed, and
judgment entered for the plaintiff in this court for the amount
claimed with interest.
. The points decided in this case reduce
themselves to two, and in both of these
the conclusion of the court would seem
to be abundantly sustained by the authorities. - In the first place, it was held
that by the common law the receipt in a
bill of lading may be explained and controlled by parol in favor of a prior carrier against an intermediate as well as
against the ultimate consignee ; and in
the second place, that a custom to deduct from the freight earned by such
prior carrier for the value of any deficiency according to the bill of lading is
invalid. The other points touched upon
in the case seem either to have been the
steps by which the court reached these
conclusions, or else to have turned upon
questions of fact. The cases bearing
upon the first of these points are collected
in the third edition-of Redfield on Railways, vol. 2, § 169, pp. 141-143. Judge
REDFIELD here says: "In regard to
parties who have no direct interest in the
goods, and no authority to adjust any
deficiencies or damages, who are but intermediate carriers or middlemen -between the carrier and the consignee,
such questions cannot be raised in an
action for freight." Citing Canfleld v.
Northern Railway, 18 Barb. 586; Bissell
v. Price, 16 Illinois R. 408.
As to the second point involved in the
principal case, it is now generally agreed
that the true office of a custom or usage
is to explain that in a contract which has

been left ambiguous by the parties orto
add something to the expressed provisiotis
of an agreement, but that it cannot be
allowed to have any operation where it
is manifestly contrary to the intention
of the parties, or where it would controvert an established fule of law: May v.
Babcock, 4 Ohio R. 334; Commonwealth
v. Doane, 1 Cush. 5; Kirchner v. Venus,
12 Moore, P. C. C.. 361 ; Schooner Beeside, 2 Sumner 567; Homer v. Dow, 10
Mass. R. 26; Randall v. Botch, 12 Pick.
107 ; Eager v. Atlas Ins. Co., 14 Id.
141 ; Paxton v. qourtnay, 2 F. & F.
.131 ; Boldero v. East India Co., 26 Beav.
316; Wayne v. Steamboat, 16 Ohio R.
421; Gibson v. Crich, 1 H. & C. 142;
Bryant v. Comanonwealth Ins. Co., 6
Pick. 131 ; Seecomb v. Provincial Ins.
Co., 10 Allen 305; Dodd v. Farlow, 11
Id. 426 ; Singleton v. Hilliard,I Strobhart 203; Norton v. School District, 37
Vermont 521 ; Walkerv. Transportation
Co., 3 Wallace, U. S., 150 ; Turney v.
Wilson, 7 Yerg. 340; Perkinsv.."anklin Bank, 21 Pick. 483; Suse v. Pomp,
8 C. B. N. S. 538; Sweeting v. Pearce,
9 Id. 534; 2 Redfield on Railways, 3d
edition, 143, note 5; 2 Greenleaf on
Evidence, § 251 ; Ansgell on Carriers,
§ 229.
In the principal case, the usage attempted to be set up, being tt variance
with the rule of law allowing parol evidence to contradict the receipt contained
in a bill of lading (2 Redfield on Rail-
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wayr, 3d edition, 143, 146 , r'Greenlcaf
on Evidence 305 ; and see the authorities
cited in the first division of the principal
case), must, it would seem, have been
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condemned on this ground alone, even
if, as a matter of fact, the testimony had
been sufficient to establish its prevalence.
H. N. S.

Supreme Court of Maine.
CYNTHIA S. LEATHERS, ADM'X., v. JAMES GREENACRE.
At common law, a will of personal property, written in the testator's own hand,
without seal, though no witnesses were present at its publication, is good; and no
particular form of expression is material, if only the testator's intention is manifest.
By R. S. c. 74, § 18, "1a soldier in actual service, or a mariner at sea, may
di~pose of his personal estate and wages,"1 as he might have done under the common law.
The terms "in actual service," and "engaged in an expedition," are synonymous.
The term cIexpedition" is not to be confined to that movement of the troops
which immediately precedes the actual conflict and shock of battle.
If, during the late rebellion,-aud after he had been mustered into the military
service of the United States, but while he remained in barracks, or while thus
quartered at any military station in one of the loyal states not exposed to the incurs.ous of the enemy, and before he had crossed over to the seat of war with his regiment to take part in the hostilities existing there, and before he bad began to move
under military orders against the foe,-a soldier had made a will without observing
the usual statute formalities, it would not be deemed the will of a "soldier in
actual service," and therefore not entitled to probate as such.
But having marched into the enemy's country from which he never returned, and
encamped among a hostile population, and acting in conjunction with soldiers who
were confronted by the rebel army, although he was in winter quarters and not, at.
the tbe of making his will, occupied with any present movement of the troops,
but was on some service detached from his own regiment, he would be deemed a
"soldier in actual service," and his will be sustained if good at common law.
In August 1862, J. B. L. enlisted in the 1st regiment of Maine cavalry, and
was thereafterwards, in the same month, mustered into the U. S. inilitary service.
March 6th 1863, while lying in camp at Stafford C. HI., Vahe wrote a long letter
to the defendant (with whom he had previously deposited the two notes mentioned
in his letter), in which he said:-" As life is uncertain, I will give you my wishes
in regard to my property, if I should fall here." "1The fade of the note that" G.
H. L. "owes me and now in your hands, and also the note against" C. S., "cand
interest, I want you to distribute among my brothers and sisters as you think proper, and all other property to my wife (naming her), and for her to pay my debts,"
(signed.) March 2d 1864, he started on a raid to Richmond in company with
others under military orders, was captured and died in prison, March 16th follow
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ing :--Held, that J. B. L. was a "soldier in actual service," when he wrote the
letter, and that it was a will entitled to probate.

[THE foregoing case will be found reported in full, ante, page
533, and we have repeated the syllabus here to add a note which
a correspondent has sent us, calling attention to a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States upon a similar point, and
suggesting a different reason for the indulgence shown by the law
to soldiers' wills. EDS. Am. LAw REG.]
It may be interesting to observe the
different construction given to the phrase
"in actual service," by th Supreme
Court of Maifie in -the foregoing case,
and by the Supreme Court of the United
State. in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheaton
20. The court in Maine were construing
that phrase as used in the statutes of that
state (R. S. c. 74, § 18), which provide
that " soldiers in actual service," may
dispose of their personal estate by written
will not conforming to the ordinary rules
of attestation.
The United States Supreme Court
was construing that phrase as used in the
5th amendment to the Constitution of the
United Stateswhich allows persons "in
the land or naval forces or in the militia
when in actual service," to be held to
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime," without any "presentment
or indictment of a grand jury."
The court in Maine decided that the
informal military will could not be
deemed valid if it were written by the
soldier "while he remained in barracks
at Augusta, Me., or while thus quartered at anypermanent military depot or
station in one of the loyal states not exposed to the incursions of thh enemy,"
&c. The United States Supreme Court
decided that the militia-man was in
actual service as soon as he reached the
place of rendezvous and was mustered

in, although that place was in Pennsylvania, a state not occupied, invaded, or
threatened b1 the enemy: and declared
that such rendezvous " is the terminus a
quo the service, the pay, and subjection
to the articles of war are to commence
and continue." (See also, Martin v.
Mott, 12 Wheaton 19).
The reason of the rule as to military
wills would secm to be not nimia imperitia, the ignorance or unskilfulness
of the soldier,-for the soldier may be,
or may have been a lawyer or a judge,nor the near approach of extreme peril,
in an actual advance by or upon the
.enemy,--cure in expeditione occupatus
sit, as the Supreme Court of Maine expressly affirms, but it is that the soldier
is not suojure,--is subject to the despotism of military authority;-cannot leave
rendezvous, barrack, or camp, without
his commander's permission, any more
than he can quit his post when on guard,
or his saddle when in actual cavalry
charge, and is liable to be tried and punished as a deserter, or as absent without
leave, if he presume, without such permission, to go forth in search of counsel,
clerk, or witness.
If such be the reason of the law, why
should the state court differ from the
Federal court in its construction of the
words "in actual service" ?
J. A. B.
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
BARR v. REITZ.
A voluntary sale of chattels, to affect vendor's creditor, must be accompanied
by an actual change of possession, and the possession must continue in the
purchaser.
Where actual delivery does not attend the sale, it is fraudulent per se, and the
court is bound to tell the jury so.
The burden of proving the delivery lies on the purchaser, who must establish
his possession by sufficient evidence.
But in considering the question what is an actual delivery, the nature of the
property, and circumstances attending the sale, must be taken into account.
The principle underlying all the cases is, that there must be an actual separation of the property from the possession of the former owner at the time of the
sale, or within a reasonable time afterwards, according to the nature of the property
delivered.
Where one about to move away sold, by bill of sl, his household goods to 'a
creditor commencing housekeeping, and delivered the key of the house to the
purchaser, receiving credit to the amount of the claim due, and cash for the
balance of the sale, and moved away, it was error in the court to pronounce the
sale a legal fraud. The question of possession should have been left to the jury.

ERROR to the Court of .Common Pleas of Jefferson county.
WF. P. & G. A. .Tenks, for plaintiff in error.
A. L. Cordon, for-defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
AGNE W , J.-It is settled law that a voluntary sale of cattels
must be accompanied by an actual change of possession; and the
possession must continue in the purchaser. A temporary change
and early return of the property into the hands of the vendor
leaves it still exposed 6 the executions of creditors. A merely
formal or constructive delivery will not defeat an execution.
Where such delivery does not attend the sale, it is fraudulent per

se. The burden of proving the delivery lies on the purchaser,
who must establish his possession by sufficient evidence.
The authorities to sustain these positions are so numerous that
it would be an affectation of research to cite tlem all. Many of

the cases will be found collected in the opinions delivered in
Chase v. Balston, 6 Casey 539.

See also XTilne v. Henry, 4

Wright 358 ; Brown v. Kelle, 7 Id. 106 ; Steelwagon v. 7leffries,
8 Id. 411.
But in considering the question what ii an actual delivery, the
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nature of the property and circumstances attending the sale must
be taken into the account. We are not, in carrying out a mere
rule of policy, to confound all distinctions between that which is
capable of easy delivery, and"that which is not. Squared timber
lying in the woods, or piles of boards in a yard, are incapable of
the same treatment as a piece of cloth, or- a horse: Chase v.
Ralston, 6 Casey 539 ; Haynes v. H-unsickaer, 2 Id. 58 ; Herron
v. Fry, 2 Penna. R. 268.. So, there are many cases which allow
the force of those circumstances which take away any false color
gr appearance of ownership remaining in the seller: Me Vieker
v.. May, 3 Barr 224 ; Jorden v. Frink, Id. 442; Linton v. Butz,
7 Id. 89 ; Faunce v. Lesley, 6 Id. 121 ; Hoofsmith v. Cope, 6
Whart. 53 ; Brady v. .aines, 6 iaarris 113 ; Torsyth v. Matthew's, 2 Id. 100; Graham v. McCreary, 4 Wright 515. To
these may b added Dunlap v. Bournonville, 2 Casey 72, and
Hugus v. Robinson, 12 Harris 9.
Of Dunlap v. Bournonvilte, it was said in &eelwagon v.
Jeffries, 8 Wright, that it stands on the very outer verge of settied principles; and- perhaps the same remark may be made upon
Hugus v. Robinson. But, without affirming their doctrines to
the extent these cases might seem to warrant, it is. sufficient to
say they are illustrations of the -principle we have s ated-that
the circumstances may prevent the court from pronouncing it a
fraudyer se, and carry the case to the jury on the facts, with
proper instruction from the court on the law-if the jury find the
delivery of possession merely formal or constructive.
The principle which underlies all the cases is, that there must
be an actual separation of the property from -the possession of the
former owner, at the time of the sale, or within a reasonable time
afterwards, according to the nature of the property delivered.
But in effectuating this change what difference does it make,
whether the property be -removed from the owner, or the owner
remove from the property? It is not the mere place the property
occupies which gives color of possession to the former owner, but
it is the connection the place itself has with the owner, indicating
his apparent control over it. Graham v. McCreary, and some
others of the cases cited, sustain this assertion, if authority be
needed to prove so plain a proposition.
In the present case the court affirmed the dtfendant's point,
that the bill
.aL1v from Brown to Barr was fraudulent and void,
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because the property therein mentioned was not delivered at the
time of sale. This took the question of delivery from the jury,
and affirmed that the sale was a legal fraud, and the question is,
therefore, whether the plaintiff had given such proof as entitled
him to have the question of possession submitted to the jury.
We think there was such evidence.
Barr was a young married man about going to housekeeping,
and needed the articles-which were chiefly household goodssold to him by Brown, who was then on the point of moving out
of the county. Brown owed him a considerable sum for labor,
which was accounted for in the sale, and the balance paid by
Barr in money. The arrangement was made verbally between
them a day or two before the 3d of May, and was on that day
finally consummated by a written bill of sale, and delivery of
possession by Brown to Barr. The key of the house was given
by Brown to Barr, who gathered up some articles lying outside,
put them into the house and locked it up. Brown was preparing
to leave the county, but not being quite ready to go, remained in
the house from three to six days, the witness being unable to
specify the precise day he left.
In the mean time he must have used another key, as tt'e testimony of Margaret Hough tends to show. He then left, went out
of the county, and did not return, the property remaining locked
up and the key in the possession of. Barr until the sheriff made
his levy, which was from three to six days after the departure of
Brown. Before the ]evy,- and also on the day of sale, Barr gave
the sheriff notice that the property was his, and. not to levy or
sell. Brown had held the house under a verbal lease for a year,
which expired on the preceding 1st day of April, and held on
(as his landlord testified) without anything being said, but leaving it very manifest that in moving away he abandoned possession
of the premises. Under these circumstances, clearly this was not
a case to be taken from the jury and pronounced upon by the
court as a legal fraud. The delivery of possession was not
merely formal or colorable, but by the removal of Brown, and
his entire disconnection from it, the property was left in the possession and control of Barr, who held the key and thus controlled
the house in which it was locked up. He controlled it just as
actually as though the property had been removed from Brown:
The separation of the property from Brown was complete. How
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far Brown might be liable to Darragh, his landlord, for the rent
of a second year, by his temporary holding over, is not a question
in this case. The fact is clear, Brown abandoned the possession
of the premises, not intending to return ; that he did not return,
and that he left the key in the possession of Barr.... The delivery
of a. key where goods are locked up is a delivery of the goods
themselves. It may be symbolical only and not actual, where the
seller still remains in apparent connection with the goods; but
here the seller had left the possession after an actual delivery,
and no longer appeared to control them; while the time of his
'departure was not unreasonably delayed, -and the goods themselves were not-ordinary merchandise but household goods.
The judgment must therefore be reversed, and a venire
facias de novo awarded.

Court of Apeals of Nrew York.
HENRY RORABACK, RESPONDENT, v. ALMUS STEBBINS,
APPELLANT.
A married woman has no legal right tor confess a judgment, but such judgment
if confessed is not void, but only voidable.
If, therefore, she allows a judgment confessed-by her to a bond fide creditor to
stand, and her property to be sold under an execution, the purchaser acquires a
good title against all persons, except other creditors having a lien on the property.

THIs was an action to recover the value of a sleigh, of which
the plaintiff claimed to be the owner, taken and converted by the
defendant.
The material facts were as follows:One R. D. Cornwell and Harriet Cornwell (wife of one James
Cornwell) were partners in the livery business at Homer, and,
as such, were the owners of' certain real and personal property.
Harriet Cornwell claimed to be the owner of the sleigh in controversy, and both plaintiff and defendant substantially claim title
thereto through her.
The plaintiff's claim is based upon these facts. Harriet Cornwell being indebted to R. D. Cornwell, on the 12th of April
1856 confessed a judgment to him for a sum of $1800.
Harriet Cornwell and her husband occupied a house in the town
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of Homer until the month of July 1857, when they removed to
the town of Moravia, Cayuga county. They left this sleigh
together with other sleighs in the barn, on the premises they had
rented and occupied in the town of Homer, and they also left
some furniture in the house they had occupied on the same premises. Richard D. Cornwell issued an execution upon his judgment, and on the 29th of June 1857 levied upon this sleigh and
other property, as the property of Harriet Cornwell, the defendant in the execution. At the time of the levy by the sheriff,
James Cornwell, the husband of Harriet, was present, and turned
out the property. The sale took place on the 25th of July 1857,
and at the sheriff's sale the plaintiff bid off the sleigh for the sum
of $105. The sleigh was left in the barn, and not moved. One
Randall, who owned the premises, and had rented them to Cornwell and his wife, and had resumed possession of the same, on
their abandonment of the premises, which was before the sale,
was present at the sale. The plaintiff, when he bid off the sleigh,
asked Randall if he could leave it in the barn, and he told him
he could, and it remained there until taken away by the tax collector in January 1858. -The plaintiff'did not pay the sheriff the
amount of his bids; but it appeared that there was an open
account between the plaintiff and Cornwell--the plaintiff in the
execution-and on the 16th of August, Cornwell, as such plaintiff, receipted the amount of the plaintiff's bid on the back of the
execution.
The defendant claims title to the sleigh under the following
circumstances :-On the 18th of August 1857, the assessors of
the town of Homer assessed the firm of R. D. Cornwell & Co. in:
the sum of $1300 as the value of their real estate, and in the
sum of $1000 as the value of their personal property, upon
which assessment the supervisors of said county levied and
imposed a tax of $12.93; and on the the 12th of December 1857,
the said Board of Supervisors issued their warrant to the town
collector of said town of Homer, commanding him to. collect the
amount of said tax, and in case of default to levy the same by
distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the persons so
assessed. By virtue of this warrant, the collector, in January
1858, seized the sleigh in question and advertised it, and sold it
at public auction, and it was bid off by the defendant for the sum
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of $13.70, that being the highest sum bid for the same, and the
sleigh was delivered tg him.
The court charged the jury that the defendant, Almus Stebbins,
acquired no title to the sleigh in question by virtue of his purchase thereof at the tax sale, to which the defendant excepted.
The court further charged. the jury, that the only question in the
case for them to determine was, whether the plaintiff or Richard
D. Cornwell purchased the sleigh in question at the execution
sale, and was the owner thereof at the time the plaintiff demanded
it of the defendant; to which the defendant also excepted. The
court also charged that, if the plaintiff purchased the sleigh for
himself, and he owned it when he demanded it of the defendant,
he is entitled to recover ; to which the defendant also excepted.
Butif the plaintiff, purchased the sleigh at the execution sale
for Richard D. Cornwell, and as his agent, and said Cornwell
owned it at the time the plaintiff demanded it, the jury should
find a verdict for the defendant; to which the defendant's counsel
also excepted. The court further charged that the plaintiff could
not recover, unless the evidence satisfied the jury that he owned
the sleigh; to which the defendant also excepted.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff; and judgment thereon
was affirmed at the General Term; and the defendant appealed to
this court.
0. Porter,for the appellant.
John Hf. Reynolds, for the respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DAvIEs, C. J.-As to plaintiff's title to the sleigh, thQre is no
controversy that Harriet Cornwell was indebted to Richard D.
Cornwell in the amount for which she confessed judgment. It
was competent for her to secure payment of such indebtedness
out of any property owned by her. She could mortgage, assign,
or convey any such property for such purpose, and divest her
title thereto, and vest the ownership thereof in her grantee, or
any one claiming under him.
This court held in Watkins v. Abrahams, 24 N. Y. 72, that a
married woman could not confess a judgment, under the Code, and
that such a judgment would be set aside on her motion. It was
held that she was placed on the same footing with an infant 'in
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this respect. It follows, from this, that the judgment is not void,
but voidable merely. If she elects to allow it to stand, and the
title of her property, through this instrumentality, to be changed,
no good reason is perceived why she may not do so. It has been
repeatedly held, in this court, that a married woman may effectually dispose of property, which is either hers, or treated by
her husband as hers; and even that a mortgage by the wife of the
husband's goods was valid, he. standing by and assenting to it;
that the assent of the husband was only important, as estopping
him from claiming the goods as his own, after permitting the wife
to deal with them as hers: -Edgerton v. Thomas, 5 Seld. 40;
Sherman v. Elder, 24 N. Y. 381; Smith v. Krnapp, 27 Id. 277 ;
.Buckley v. Wells, 83 Id. 518; and Sammis v. M1cLaughlin,
decided in December 1866. James Cornwell, -the husband, is
estopped from claiming the sleigh as his property. He was
present at the time of the levy by the sheriff, through which this
plaintiff claims, and turned out this sleigh to the sheriff as the
property of Harriet Cornwell, the defendant in the execution.
He is for ever precluded from setting up the condrary. There is
no pretence that the title to the sleigh was in any other person.
It is, therefore, very clear that the property in the sleigh was in
Harriet Cornwell.
The next question is, has that title, by virtue of the judgment,
execution, and sale, been vested in the plaintiff? In Miller v.
Barle, 24 N. Y. 110, this court held that a judgment, entered
upon a confession not authorized by the Code, was good between
the parties ; and that, when the property of the defendant had
been sold under an execution upon such a judgment, the pur-"
chaser's title cannot be impeached by a creditor, not having a
judgment or lien on the property, at the time of the levy. It
was said in the opinion of one of the judges, that if the defendant in the execution chose to adopt the form of confessing a judgment, and permitting a sale of his property under execution
thereon, for the purpose of paying a debt owing by him, it was
not perceived that any objection could be taken by a party, who
had acquired a subsequent judgment and lien, to such payment;
that the defendant certainly would be estopped from alleging or
setting up that the judgment was not valid, or, in other words,
was not a judgment; and that after he stood by and saw his property sold under an execution issued under it, and the proceeds
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paid over or ar.lied upon his debt, Le would be e.topped from
recalling such payn nt. Judge JAMES, 11 the other opinion
delivered in that case, observed: "1As between the parties themselves, however, the judgmeit confessed should be held legal and
valid; that being so, tl. levy and sale of property under it was
good, as against the defendant and all the world, except judgmentcreditors existing and having a lien upon his property. Until the
plaintiffs recovered their judgment against Heth (the person confessing the judgment), they had no lien upon his property.
.Until then, he had a right to dispose of it, or its proceeds, in
payment or satisfaction of his debts, or in any other way not
fraudulent."
Again : "So in this case, the debt for which the confession was
givefn being bond fide, the property levied upon might have been
carefully applied by the judgment-debtor, without judgment, to
the payment of such debt, at any time before the plaintiff in this
suit obtained any legal or equitable lien thereon; and the proceeds of such property having been applied to the payment of
such bond fide debt, through the instrumentality of a defective
judgment, before any legal or equitable lien was obtained upon
it by any other creditor, the property cannot be recalled, nor its
proceeds recovered by a subsequent judgment-creditor, although
the prior judgment is void as to him."
A brief recurrence to the facts presented by the record will
show how decisive the doctrine of this case is, when applied to
that now under consideration. Assuming, for the present, that
the sleigh was the property of Harriet Cornwell, then we have
these controlling facts:-. That she was bond fide indebted to
Richard D. Cornwell; 2. That through the instrumentality of a
judguent, execution, and sale thereon, the proceeds of this sleigh,
realized on a sale thereof by virtue of said execution, were
applied in part payment of said debt; 3. That such sale took
place, and proceeds were paid over, two days before the assessment-roll for the taxes for the town of Homer.was completed,
that being done on the 18th of August 1857. The tax was not
levied and imposed until the annual meeting of the Board of
Supervisors of the county of Cortland, which, in that county,
takes place on the Tuesday next after the general election in each
year: Edm. ed. of Stat., vol. 1, p. 339.
No lien for this tax upon this sleigh, assuming it to have been
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the property of Harriet Cornwell, was acquired until some day in
November 1857. At this time all her right and title therein had
been disposed of in payment of a debt justly due and owing by
her; and, on the authority of Miller v. Earle, ubi supra, we
must hold that the tax was no lien on this particular piece of property, and that the defendant acquired no title thereto by virtue
of the tax sale.
It is now contended -on the part of the defendant, that, so far
as the proof shows, the sleigh belonged to James Cornwell, the
husband of Harriet Cornwell. It is not perceived how this position shows title in the defendant.
If it was the property of James 'Cornwell, it clearly could not
be taken and sold for a tax imposed and levied against Harriet
Cornwell. The tax was levied, so far as the persons were concerned, against Richard D. Cornwell and Harriet Cornwell, as
composing the firm of R. D. Cornwell & Co. There is no pretence that James Cornwell was ever a member of that firm, or
that any tax was levied or imposed against him or upon his property. The warrant-to the collector only authorized him to seize
and sell the property of the persons whose names were set down
in the tax lists, and'the name of James Cornwell does not appear
there. If, therefore, the sleigh was the property of James Corn,
well, the defendant acquired no title to it by virtue of his purchase at the tax sale. Again, this argument has no pertinency;
except to establish the proposition, that the plaintiff'acquired no
title by virtue of his purchase on the execution sale on the judgment against' Harriet Cornwell. But, as' already -remarked,
James Cornwell is estopped, by his act in turning out to thesheriff this sleigh as the property of Harriet Cornwell, from
hereafter setting up or claiming that, in fact, he *as the owner
of the sleigh. The defendant is in no position which justifies
him in asserting the ownership of the 'sleigh to be in James.
Cornwell.
Upon the testimony adduced at the trial, the question legitimately arose, whether, at the execution sale, the 'sleigh was,
in fact, purchased by the plaintiff in the execution, Richard D.
Cornwell. The judge, therefore, properly charged the jury that
it was important for them to determine which made the purchasefor whichever did was the owner at the time of the demand and

conversion-and that if the plaintiff purchased the sleigh for him-
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self, and he owned it when he demanded it, he was entitled to
recovery ; hut if the plaintiff purchased the sleigh at the execution sale for Richard D. Cornwell, and as- his agent, and said
Cornwell owned it, then the.jury should find a verdict for the
defendant.
In all these propositions the learned justice was undoubtedly
correct. If the plaintiff purchased the sleigh for himself, and on
his own account, then he unquestionably became the owner thereof, and it was a matter of~no moment whether the plaintiff in that
execution required payment of the purchase-money at the time,
or gave him credit therefor. The important fact appeared that
the defendant in that execution had credit for the amount of the
bid, on the judgment against her. The plaintiff, in that judgment,
-was.estopped from denying the fact of such payment. The jury,
therefore, found as a fact, that the plaintiff himself became the
purchaser. of the sleigh at the execution sale ; and the conclusion
of law followed that he thereupon became the owner thereof.
The judge also very properly left it to the jury, to find whether'
the purchase was not made by or for Richard D. Gornwell. If it
had been, then he became the owner of the sleigh, and it would
have been liable to seizure and sale for payment of the tax levied
and imposed on him and Harriet Cornwell ; and the defendant,
by virtue of the tax sale, iould'have acquired title thereto. In
such case, as the judge told the jury, their verdict should be for
the defendant. But the jury ignored this view of the case, and
found that the plaintiff had himself become such purchaser and
thereby the owner of the sleigh, and consequently -etitled to
recover the damages he had sustained by the taking and conversion thereof by the defendant.
We have assumed, in the examination of this case, that the
tax, and the sale thereunder, levied and imposed upon Richard
D. Cornwell and Harriet Cornwell, was in all respects legal and
regular. In the view we take of this case, we do not deem it
needful to express any opinion upon that question, and we wish to
be distinctly understood as expressing none. We have disposed
of the case on the assumption that the tax was legal and the sale
regular.
The exceptions taken to the admission of testimony are wholly
unimportant and immaterial, in the light we regard this case.
The only exception which had any bearing upon any important
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question submitted to the jury was, the admission of proof on the
part of the plaintiff, that he had an open account with R. D.
Cornwell, the plaintiff in the execution. Plaintiff by his bid of
the sleigh, the same having been accepted by the sheriff and the
plaintiff in the execution, became a debtor to such plaintiff for
the amount of his bid. The plaintiff by crediting such amount
on the execution discharged the defendant therein from such sum,
and was estopped from denying payment of that sum by her.
For the purpose of showing a fact, certainly not very important,
how the matter was adjusted between the purchaser and the plaintiff in the execution, the judge permitted the fact that there was
an open account between them to be proved. It was not material
or important, and its admission is no ground for a new trial.
Upon a careful examination of the whole case, I am clearly of
the opinion that it has been rightly disposed of, and that the judgment should be affirmed with costs.
PORTER, J., took no part in the decision: all the other judges
concurring,
Judgment affirmed.,

Supreme Court of New York.
HIRAMTq LEWIS v. THE NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD
COMPANY.
The fare of a passenger on a railroad is a debt within the Acts of Congress
called the Legal Tender Acts, although it be demanded and paid before the pas-

senger has been carried any part of the way.
Where a certain sum per mile has been established as the legal fare for carrying.
a passenger on a railroad, the company is bound to accept payment of the fare in
United States notes at their legal value.

CASE agreed upon. The plaintiff claims judgment for the
penalty of $50, for defendants asking and receiving a greater
fare from him on their railroad from Syracuse to Canastota, than
they were authorized by law to demand and receive of him.

C arles B. Sedgwiole, for plaintiff.
D. Pratt, for defendants.
Thc orinion of the court was delivered by
BALco'l, J.-On the 7th day of May 1867, the plaintiff applied
at the offlee of the defendants, at the city of Syracuse, to purchase
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a ticket for passage on be defendants' railroad from that city to
Canastota, in the coui.t% of Madison. The defendants asked and
demnded of the plaitifl: for such ticket and passage, the sum
of forty-four cents in lawful ,eoinof the United States or fifty-five
cLn s in paper currency. Th'e plaintiff offered and tendered to
the defendants forty-four cents in United States notes in payment
for such ticket and passage, which the defendants refused to
receive; and thereupon the plaintiff paid and the defendants
received for such passage and ticket fifty-five cents in United
States notes. The plaintiff handed to the defendants' agent a
one-dollar 'United States note and such agent paid back to the
plaintiff forty-five cents in fractional currency;. which was the
way the plaintiff paid for such ticket and passage. The distance
from Syracuse to Canastota is twenty-two miles.
Chapter 76 of the laws of 1853 (Laws of 1853, p. 113, § 7)
requires the defendants to carry way passengers on their road at
a rate not to exceed two cents per mile. And it is provided by
chapter 185 of the laws of 1857 (Laws of 1857, vol. 1, p. 432),
that "any railroad company which shall ask and receive a greater
rate of fare than that allowed by law, shall forfeit fifty dollars,
which sum may be recovered, together with the excess so received,
by the party paying the same."
The Act of Congress, approved February 25th 1862, authorizing the issue of United States notes, declares that they shall " be
lawful money and a legal tender for all debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties on imports and
interest," &c.
The Court of Appeals has settled the question in this state that
this Act of Congress is constitutional and valid: 27 N. Y. Rep.
400.
The only material question, therefore, for determination in this
case is, whether the Act of Congress is broad enough to require
the defendants to take United States notes in payment of fare on
their road, when they demand and receive such fare in advance
of transportation on their road.
It is not disputhd by the plaintiff's counsel that the defendants
may refuse to carry any person in their passenger cars who will
not pay the legal fare before he is carried any distance in their
cars.
It is claimed by the defendants' counsel that no debt is ctuc from
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a passenger to the defendants before he is carried any distance in
their cars, and that, as the Act of Congress only makes the notes
of the United States a legal tender for debts, the defendants may
exact payment of fare of passengers in advance of transportation
in gold or silver coin of the United States, or may require them
to pay its market value in United States notes. Is such fare to
b deemed and regarded a debt within the meaning of the Act of
Congress, when demanded of a passenger before he enters the defendants' cars to be carried from one station to another on their
railroad ? A ]MfS. opinion of Air. Justice GRIER, of the Supreme
Court of the United States, in The Philadelphia and Reading
Railroad Co. v. Morrison and Ot1he's, favoring the position that
such fare, when exacted in advance, is not- a debt within the meaning of the Act of Congress, has been presented to us for our consideration. That opinion was delivered in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; and if there
be no distinction in principle between the case in which it was
delivered and this, it is not controlling authority in this case.
It is only entitled to the respect due to the. opinion of an able
and learned judge upon a question somewhat similar to the one
in this case. But I think, there is a distinction between that case
and this, though it is-difficult to ascetain from the opinion'in that
case the precise facts on which it was based. If, however, there
be no material distinction in principle between the two cases, I
am constrained to say, my opinion is, Mr. Justice GRmt has put
too narrow a construction- uporn the Act of Congress ; and that
according to the true meaning of that act the defendants are bound
to accept United States notes, issued under such act, in payment"
of fare upon their railroad when demanded in advance of transportation on such road.
The defendants are common carriers of p~rsons, and are therefore under a legal obligation to carry all persons who apply for
passage on their railroad, and tender the legal fare. Angell
says: " There is an implied engagement on the part of public
carriers of persons not to refuse those who apply for seats by
their conveyance, the privilege of travelling in such a manner,
provided there is room for them, and a tender of, or offer to pay,
the fare is made at the time :" Angell on Carriers, 3d ed., § 524.
Edwards says, the duties of a common carrier of persons "resemble those of the common carrier of goods; like him, he has
VOL. XV.-45
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entered into a& engagement with t1he public, and is bound to
serve all who require his services." He also says, such a carrier
of persons "1has a right to demand prepayment of his hire, but is
not at liberty to choose between those whom he will and will not
receive:" Edwards on Bailments 577. The same doctrine is laid
down in Redfield on Railways 844, and it is undisputed elementary
law.
This case is the same in principle as it would be if the parties
had previously made a special contract, which bound the defendants to carry the plaintiff as a passenger in one of their cars,
from Syracuse to Canastota, on being paid the legal fare between
those places, viz., two cents per mile. If the parties had made
such a contract, the fare between those places would have been a
debt due from the plaintiff to the defendants, at the time the
former applied at the office of the latter for a passage, and offered
to pay for a ticket that, would entitle him to a ride in one of their
cars from one of such places to the other ; and in that case United
States notes would have been a legal tender for such fare. Now
as the rights and obligations of the parties are placed on the same
footing by the law of the lan& that they would have been by such
a special contract as I have supposed, I am of the opinion the
fare the plaintiff offered to 'pay the defendants from Syracuse to
Canastota should be deemed a debt that was due from the former
to the latter, within the meaning of the Act of Congress, at the
time the offer was made to pay the same.
If these views are correct, the plaintiff had the right to pay
his fare from Syracuse to, Canastota in United States notes, at
the value expressed on the face of the same.; and the defendants
were guilty of extortion in exacting of him payment of such fare
at a higher rate than two cents per mile in such notesThe legal fare tAe defendants had the right to demand and
receive of the plaintiff was -forty-four cents, and they compelledhim to, pay them fifty-five cents in United States notes. The
extortion, therefore, was eleven cents. For which eleven cents
and the penalty of 0O, I am of opinion the plaintiff is entitled
to a judgment with the costs allowed in such a case, by section
378 of the Code.
MAsoN and BOARDmAN, J3., delivered opinions in which they
came to the same conclusion.
Judgment accordingly.
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Wisconsin District.

STEPHEN MORGAN v. THE SCHOONER BEN FLINT.
Sailors on the lakes are merchant seamen, and are entitled in a proper case to
be cured at the expense of the vessel, if taken sick or hurt without their fault,
while in the service of the vessel.
When a sailor takes advantage of the rate of wages before shipping on a short
voyage on the lakes, and receives a hurt on entering the port of discharge, without.
any fault or neglect of the officers, and he takes his discharge and his full pay,
and afterwards contracts a debt for medicine, &c., the vessel is not liable.

THE schooner was employed in transporting lumber from ports
on Lake Michigan, in the state of Michigan, to the port of Chicago, in the state of fllinois. Libellant was a seaman on board
during the summer of 1866, but contracting before departure on
each voyage at the rate of the then current wages. In the month
of September he shipped on. board, at Chicago, as seaman for the
round trip, from there to Manistee, in Michigan, and back, at the
rate of two dollars and fifty cents per day. The vessel was
freighted at Manistee with lumber, in the hold and on deck, in

the usual manner of stowing lumber on deck, leaving a passageway to and from either side forward of the mainmast and cabin.
The lumber near the mainmast being stowed about four and a half
feet above deck, the mainboom was brought up to an elevation
above the lumber of about ,eighteen inches, and supported. by
blocks placed on the saddle and resting against the mainmast;
These blocks or false saddles were known to all on board not to
be fastened to the mainmast, and that the boom was so elevated
solely for the purpose of managing the vessel. The vessel belug'
about to enter the harbor at Chicago on her return trip, the wind
blowing fresh, an order was given by the officer in command to
take in the mainsail, which extended over the starboard side.
When the order was given, libellant and two other seamen, who
were standing on the larboard side 'of the vessel forward, immediately proceeded to that duty. One of the seamen, about three
feet from the mainmast, crawled through the space between the
lumber and the boom; and libellant following, was hurt by-the
boom dropping across his back. The third seaman proceeded
along the passage-way. The wind blowing fresh, no doubt caused
the boom to drop, although it was secured in the usual way from
shifting. The vessel moored at her dock in Chicago, when the
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officers desired libellant to go to the marine hospital in that city;
but he preferring to leave for his home in Milwaukee, they paid
him his full wages and for one day extra, and assisted him to the
cars for Milwaukee. The hurt rendered libellant unfit for duty
for several days, requiring medicine and medical advice, nursing
and attendance in Milwaukee; to recover for which this libel is
brought. Libellant was not an experienced seaman on board a
sailing vessel, but was obedient and dutiful.
Stark

McfuUlen, for libellant.

'-Emmons & randyke, for claimant and respondent.
MpixR, District Judge.-It is contended that the officers of
the vessel had neglected their duty in not fastening to the mainmast the blocks upon which the boom rested. This, I think, is
not tenable- The blocks were placed against the mainmast in the
usual manner, known to all on board, merely for the temporary
support of the boom. The object of the elevation of the boom
and the existence of the passage-way were equally. well known.
If no passage-way had existed, or if libellant had been. required
or orderedato pass under the boom,-in either case the vessel
would be in fault in not securing the blocks, or the boom from
dropping. I do not think the vessel was in fault in this respect:
It is not necessary to prove by authorities that a seaman, having received an injury or taken sick whilst in the service of the
ship, without his fault, is to be cured, or rather cared for at the
expense of the ship. This rule is very ancient, and is universally
reeognised. Sound policy in favor of commerce, to induce seamen to ship for long voyages, and to perform laborious and hazardous duties on board, and also intrinsic equity sanction the rule.
The rule is beneficial to the owher, while he may deem it onerous.
It encourages seamen to ship on lower wages, diminishes temptation to plunder, and encourages them in the discharge of duty;
and the master will be watchful of their health; dnd careful of
their exposure to disease and accidents. The right to claim for
such expenses, or such duty on the part of the ship or vessel, in
contemplation of law, is a part of the contract for wages, and a
material ingredient in the compensation for the labor and services
of the seaman. And in the admiralty a remedy may be applied
on the principle of additional wages; and in case of neglect or
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injuries of the seaman on the part of the ship's officers, it may
be extended beyond the time of shipment or the return of the
vessel to her home port. The services of a seaman are maritime,
and whatever enters into the compensation for such services, and.
is reducible to money, is in equity decreed as a just remuneration
for such services.
This ancient and now universal marine rule, is as applicable to
seamen or mariners on the lakes, and on rivers flowing into the
ocean, as on the high seas. Seamen or mariners on board boats
or vessels employed in navigable fresh waters within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States are merchant seamen, and
are entitled to all rights, and subject to all duties as such. But
upor the equitable principle of the marine law, the same consideration under the rule may not be extended indiscriminately to all
classes of seamen. Humanity, and the interests of commerce,
demand a liberal extension of the rule towards seamen on vessels
employed in foreign trade. But the same liberality need not be
extended to a seaman shipping for a voyage of a few days on the
lakes,-particularly when additional wages are demanded at thecommencement of each voyage. It appears that libellant demanded increased wages before shipping, for each voyage as the
season advanced. And he knew that a marine hospital existed in
Chicago, where seamen are cared for after discharged from service, and where the officers of the vessel wished him to go. It
is true, that libellant was not obliged to enter the marine hospital
as a patient.
Claimant's advocate contends that libellant was in fault for
passing over the lumber and under the boom, and cannot therefore sustain his libel. To entitle a sailor to sustain a libel for
care and attendance, required in case of sickness or personal '
injury while in the service of the vessel, the disability must have
occurred without his fault. Libellant testifies that he took the
course over the lumber to save time, but he had better have said
that he thoughtlessly followed the lead of a reckless brother
sailor. Sailors are wards of the admiralty, and are rather
excused than condemned for accidental mistakes while in the
faithful and obedient discharge of duty. Even after punishment
for wilful disobedience, if they return to duty, their full wages
in many cases are allowed. A strict rule of forfeiture should not
be applied to a sailor. What may be negligence or fault in per-
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sons employed in service on land, may not be in sailors on board
of vessels. Ordinary negligence, consistent with entire good
faith, as in this instance, should not prejudice a sailor's just
right. The marine law rather overlooks ordinary negligence, but
punishes those gross faults and vices which affect or prejudice the
ship's service or discipline. The accident occurred to libellant
while in the prompt discharge of duty in obedience to a proper
command. The dropping of the boom was unforeseen and not
caused by him. Under such circumstances, I do not think that
libellant was in fault. To forfeit a claim for care or attendance
under the rule, the disability or sickness of- the seaman must be
owing to vicions or unjustifiable conduct, such as gross negligence
operating in-the nature of a fraud upon the o'*ners, wilful disobedience to orders, and persistent neglect of duty: Walton v. The
7ip Neptune, 1 Peters's Ad. 142; Beed v. Canfield, 1 Sumner
195; Johnson v., Huekins; Sprague 6'; Pierce v. The Brig
Enterprise,'Gilpin485 ; The .Nimrod,'Ware 1.
The following cases will explai' the principle upon which relief
has been allowed sick and disabled seamen. In ffarnden v.
Gordon, 2 Mason 541, the rule-is elaborately discussed, and the
court came 'to 'the conclusion that the expense of curing a sick
seaman in the course of the voyage is a charge on the ship, and
in thig charge are included not only medicines and medical
advicei but nursing, diet, and lodging, .if the seaman' be carried
ashore. 'That the court of admiralty has jurisdiction io enforce
the payment of these expenses, by a libel, for they are in the
nature of additional wages during sickness; -and thaf no stipulation contrary, to the maritime law to the injury pf seamen wil be
allowed to stand, unless an adequate additional compensation is
given to thbem. In the case of The Brigv George,1 Sumner 151,
the mate took sick during a foreign voyage and was put on shore,
where expenses were incurred for medicines, medical advice, and
attendance, it was adjudged that the shipowner shall be held
liable. In the case of The Nimrod, Ware 1, a suit for marinerA
wages, no deduction was allowed for expenses attending libellant's
sickness during' the voyage. So also in The Forest, Id. 429,
where the expenses attending the sickness of a seaman during the
voyage exceeded the balance of his wages. And in Freeman v.
Baker, 1 Blatch. & How. 372, it is decided, that a promise of a
seaman, sick in a foreign port during the voyage, to pay bills for
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his medicines, &c., is void, and does not release the ship of
liability." See also The William Harris,Ware 378; Brundet
v. Tober, Sprague 243; Ringold v. Crocker, 1 Abbott's Ad.
Rep. 344; The Atlantic, Id. 452; Walton v. The Ship Neptune,
1 Peters's Ad. 142, note.
The following cases extend the benefit of the rule beyond the
time of service of the seaman, as limited by the shipping articles ;
but it will be observed that misconduct on the part of the officers
of the vessel formed an essential ingredient in each case. In
Reed v. Canfield, 1 Sumner 189, the ship Albion having been
employed in a whaling voyage on the Pacific, came to anchor in
the harbor of I ew Bedford, her home port. The master soon
after landed, and gave permission to one of the mates also to go
on shore. Both of the mates expressed a desire to avail themselves of this permission, on the return of the bdat from landing
the master. They both concluded to go on shore, taking with
them a boat's crew. The ship being left without officers to
enforce discipline, the boat's crew, including libellant, remained
on shore after landing the mates, until a storm ensued,.which
rendered the passage of the boat from shore td the vessel tedious;
and libellant's feet were so frozen that they had to be amputated.
The disability to libellant would not have happened but for the
unwarrantable departure of the officers from their, duty. In.
'Brown v. Overton, Sprague 462, libellant, a seaman on board
the ship Madison, in a voyage from Calcutta to Boston, while
reefing a topsail, was thrown from the yard by the sudden motion
of the sail and violence of the wind, and broke both of his legs.
The master, with the aid of a passenger and one of the crew, set
the bones, and secured them in bandages and splints as well as
they could. Libellant was placed in a hammock, and continued
lying in it until four days after the arrival of the ship at Boston,
without proper attention, when he was removed to a hospital. He
was decreed indemnity for all he had suffered from the omission
of the master to go into St. Helena, the nearest port after the
accident, for surgical aid, and the master's culpable neglect of
him during the voyage and after arriving at Boston, including
expenses incurred after leaving the ship. In the case of Croucher
v. Oaklnan, 3 Allen 185, at law, the plaintiff was allowed to
recover for damages from the unlawful act of the master in
wounding and then discharging him in a foreign port, while-
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employed in the prosecution of a voyage. The plaintiff was
allowed for necessary expenses at the foreign port, and for his
return, months after the time mentioned in the shipping articles.
And in Mosely v. Scott, 14 Am. Law Reg. 599, at law, plaintiff
shipped on board a steamboat as cabin-boy, for a trip to Nashville and back to Cincinnati. During the voyage he became sick
with small-pox to such a degree that he was not able to attend to
his duty, and was compelled to take to his bed on board, where
he remained until the retirn of the boat. The master and officers
of the boat during his confinement on board neglected to furnish
him with sufficient medicine, medical advice, attendance, nursing,
and diet necessary for his comfort and cure. By reason of such
neglect plaintiff's feet were so frozen that they had to be amputated, which confined him in an hospital several months. A
demurrer to the petition, according to the practice in the state of
Ohio, was overruled. See also _Nevitt v. Clarke, Olcott 316,
where the ship in a foreign voyage was sold to foreigners without arrangements being made for the return of a sick seaman.
These are all the American cases that I have had access to. In
the first class, misconduct or neglect of the officers of the vessel
was not material. In the second class, their misconduct and
neglect towards the seaman became an important item for the
consideration of the court. Upon every principle of humanity
and equity owners of -vessels should be held liable, in amount
measured by the actual loss to the seaman, for his siclkn~ss or disability caused or aggravated by the misconduct or neglect of their
officers.
From this review of American cases I have arrived at the conclusion, that, in the absence of misconduct or neglect on the part
of the officers, the obligation of the vessel to provide for a disabled or sick seaman, should only be coextensive in duration to
that of the seaman to the vessel. The privileges and liabilities
of the parties are, in contemplation of law, measured by the
shipping articles. Interests of commerce do not require that the
privileges and duties of shipowners and seamen should be extended
beyond the reason, nature, and terms of the shipping contract,
unless for fault, misconduct, or neglect on the part of officers of
vessels towards their seamen; or, perhaps, when the removal of a
sick or disabled seaman from the vessel, or a change of treatment
then being practised, might prejudice his recovery within a

